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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4336 
 ___________ 
 
 JULIETTE PRINCE-COLLINS, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A089-564-496) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Frederic G. Leeds 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 24, 2011 
 Before:  HARDIMAN, COWEN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: August 24, 2011 ) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Juliette Prince-Collins petitions for review of a final order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her 
application for cancellation of removal.  For the following reasons, we will deny the 
petition for review in part, and dismiss it in part. 
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 Prince-Collins, a native and citizen of Dominica, entered the United States in 1990 
on a B-2 visitor’s visa that expired in February 1991.  In December 2005, Prince-Collins 
applied for a United States passport with a false birth certificate.
1
  When an officer of the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Service questioned her about the validity of 
the birth certificate, Prince-Collins admitted that she was not born in the United States 
Virgin Islands.  She was not prosecuted for the offense. 
 In 2006, Prince-Collins married a United States citizen.  She then applied for 
adjustment of status.  However, she was placed in removal proceedings under INA § 
237(a)(3)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D), as an alien who has falsely represented herself to 
be a United States citizen, and under INA § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), as a 
nonimmigrant that has remained in the United States for a time longer than permitted.  
Prince-Collins conceded removability, and voluntarily withdrew her claim to adjust 
because she was ineligible for a waiver under INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), due to 
her false claim of United States citizenship.  She instead sought relief in the form of 
cancellation of removal. 
After hearing testimony from Prince-Collins, her children,
2
 husband, and forensic 
psychological social worker, the IJ denied her application for cancellation of removal.  
                                                 
1
 The false birth certificate stated she was born in the United States Virgin Islands. 
 
2
 Prince-Collins has two United States citizen children from a previous marriage, a 
son born in 1993 and a daughter born in 2000. 
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The IJ found that Prince-Collins had proven continuous physical presence and had good 
moral character.  He found as a matter of discretion that she had not established that her 
removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, and thus denied her 
application.  See INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). 
Prince-Collins appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ’s decision without an 
opinion in August 2009.  In March 2010, Prince-Collins filed a motion to have the BIA’s 
decision reissued, which was granted.  Prince-Collins timely filed a petition for review 
with this Court. 
The Government contends that we have no jurisdiction to review the discretionary 
denial of cancellation of removal and related unexhausted claims.  We agree. 
This Court generally lacks jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions regarding 
cancellation of removal.  INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Mendez-
Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2003) (no jurisdiction to review 
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” determination).  We, however, have 
jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims or questions of law.”  INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  In addition, our jurisdiction is limited to claims in which a 
petitioner “has exhausted all administrative remedies available . . . as of right.”  INA § 
242(d)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594-95 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  This requires that the petitioner place the BIA on notice of the issue on 
appeal.  Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2005).  The BIA is “not require[d] . . 
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. to guess which issues have been presented.”  Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 122 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
Prince-Collins argues that the IJ lacked discretion to deny her cancellation of 
removal once she established statutory eligibility.  To the extent this raises a question of 
law that is reviewable under INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), we may not 
review this claim because Prince-Collins failed to raise it to the BIA.  In her appeal to the 
BIA, Prince-Collins argued that she satisfied the requirements for cancellation of removal 
and that the IJ abused his discretion in denying her application.  These arguments do not 
suggest that Prince-Collins raised the issue that the IJ lacked discretion.  Thus, we have 
no reason to believe that the BIA was on notice of her argument that the IJ lacks 
discretion to deny cancellation of removal once she established statutory eligibility. 
Prince-Collins also argues that her false claim of United States citizenship should 
not have precluded her from receiving cancellation of removal because she timely 
retracted her false claim and the matter was de minimis.  In denying her relief, the IJ 
determined that the negative factors, that she willfully and intentionally claimed to be a 
United States citizen to receive a benefit and did not disclose this information to her 
current husband, outweighed the positive factors, that her son’s life may disrupted.  Thus, 
the IJ’s analysis of Prince-Collins’ false claim of citizenship in denying her cancellation 
of removal was a matter of discretion, and beyond our jurisdiction to review.  See 
Mendez-Moranchel, 338 F.3d at 179; In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (BIA 1998) (in 
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exercising discretion, the IJ “must balance the adverse factors evidencing the alien’s 
undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations 
presented in his (or her) behalf to determine whether the granting of . . . relief appears in 
the best interest of this country.” (internal quotations omitted)). 3 
We have jurisdiction to entertain Prince-Collins’ final argument, that the BIA 
erred by summarily affirming the case without addressing the BIA’s opinion in In re 
Guadarrama, 24 I. & N. Dec. 625 (BIA 2008).  See Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 
295-96 (3d Cir. 2004).  Guadarrama held that an alien is not barred from establishing 
good moral character because she made a false claim of citizenship.  Guadarrama, 24 I. & 
N. Dec. at 626.  Prince-Collins argues that if a false claim to United States citizenship 
cannot prevent an alien from establishing good moral character, the IJ may not determine, 
in exercising his discretion, that the false claim prevents an alien from obtaining 
cancellation of removal.  Prince-Collins’ reading is too broad.  A false claim of 
citizenship is an adverse factor that an IJ must balance in exercising his discretion.  See 
In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 11.  In re Guadarrama does not apply here.  Therefore, 
the BIA did not err in affirming the IJ’s decision without considering this opinion. 
 
                                                 
3
 To the extent that Prince-Collins attempts to raise a claim that her constitutional 
rights have been violated because the IJ’s denial of relief due to her false claim of United 
States citizenship inflicted a penalty disproportionate to her offense, this claim fails.  
“Deportation proceedings . . . are purely civil action[s] to determine eligibility to remain 
in this country, not to punish.”  Scheidemann v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 83 
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For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review in part, and dismiss 
it in part. 
                                                                                                                                                             
F.3d 1517, 1520 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996). 
